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EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: FR, PARM, CA, TECH
SUBJECT: FRENCH VIEWS ON COORDINATION OF NUCLEAR EXPORT POLICY

REF: A) STATE 241799  B) PARIS 22150 (NOTAL)

1. SUMMARY: THE FRENCH TOLD ACDA DIRECTOR IKLE THAT THEY WERE NOT YET IN A POSITION TO RESPOND TO THE U.S. PROPOSAL FOR A CONFERENCE OF NUCLEAR EXPORTERS TO CONSIDER MEANS TO STRENGTHEN SAFEGUARDS ON NUCLEAR EXPORTS. ON THE FIVE POINTS THE U.S. SUGGESTED FOR DISCUSSION AT THAT PROPOSED CONFERENCE (REF A PARA 5), THE FRENCH POSED A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS: WOULD IAEA SAFEGUARDS BE EXTENDED TO NUCLEAR EXPORTS TO NWS? IS IT FEASIBLE TO RESTRICT THE FLOW OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGIES LIKE REPROCESSING THAT ARE ALREADY IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN? WOULD NOT INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ON PHYSICAL SECURITY UNWISELY PUBLICIZE METHODS OF PROTECTION? THOUGH THE FRENCH DID NOT CLOSE THE DOOR TO ATTENDING THE PROPOSED MULTINATIONAL CONFERENCE, THEY CLEARLY INDICATED THEIR OPPOSITION TO MULTINATIONAL RULE-MAKING STRUCTURES AND THEIR

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TO MULTINATIONAL RULE-MAKING STRUCTURES AND THEIR
PREFERENCE FOR BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS. THEY ADDED THAT THEY WERE NEGOTIATING THE SALE OF REPROCESSING PLANTS TO PAKISTAN AND SOUTH KOREA, BUT DEMANDING IAEA SAFEGUARDS. ATMOSPHERE OF THE DISCUSSIONS WERE CORDIAL AND CONSTRUCTIVE. END SUMMARY.

2. IN A SERIES OF TALKS ON ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ISSUES, ACDA DIRECTOR IKLE MET WITH MFA SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS DIRECTOR DE NAZELLE, CEA INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIRECTOR GOLDSCHMIDT, MFA NATODISARMAMENT CHIEF SCHRICKE, AND QUAI SECRETARY GENERAL DE COURCE (DE COURCE MEETING REPORTED SEPTEL) ON NOV 27 TO DISCUSS U.S. PROPOSAL FOR CONFERENCE ON EXPORTS OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT. HE BEGAN BY DESCRIBING HOW PROBLEMS OF NATIONAL SECURITY WOULD BE ENORMOUSLY COMPLICATED BY THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. HENCE IT WAS IN BOTH NATIONS INTERESTS TO SLOW PROLIFERATION. HE THEN DISCUSSED THE AIDE MEMOIRE PRESENTED TO THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR ON NOV 1, IN WHICH THE U.S. PROPOSED A SMALL PRIVATE CONFERENCE OF ADVANCED NUCLEAR EXPORTERS TO EXPLORE HOW TO STRENGTHEN THE INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM (REF A).

IN ADDRESSING EACH OF THE 5 POLICIES SUGGESTED FOR DISCUSSION IN THE AIDE MEMOIRE, HE STRESSED THE PRELIMINARY NATURE OF U.S. THINKING AND OUR DESIRE TO CONSIDER CONSTRUCTIVE CRITICISM AND SUGGESTIONS. IN REPLY, THE FRENCH POSED A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS GIVEN BELOW.

3. ON SUGGESTED POINT 1 (REF A PARA 5), EXTENDING SAFEGUARDS TO NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES (AS OPPOSED TO WEAPONS ONLY), THE FRENCH HAD NO OBJECTIONS BUT SHOWED INTEREST IN U.S. OBJECTIVES CONCERNING THE BILATERAL LIMITED TEST BAN TREATY NEGOTIATION, AND IN THE RECENT VLADIVOSTOK DISCUSSIONS. GOLDSCHMIDT ASKED ABOUT THE PNE PROVISION IN THE LTB TREATY, WHICH IKLE EXPLAINED HAD NOT YET BEEN WORKED OUT.

4. ON SUGGESTION 2, NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES (NNWS), THE FRENCH ASKED IF THE U.S. WERE PROPOSING A REQUIREMENT FOR IAEA SAFEGUARDS ONLY ON EXPORTS TO NNWS, OR WOULD IT INCLUDE NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES AS WELL. THE HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLE OF CANADIAN EXPORTS OF URANIUM TO U.S. WAS RAISED, BUT BEHIND SECRET.

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THE QUESTIONS LAY CONCERN OVER EXPORTS TO FRANCE AND, AS LATER REVEALED, AWARENESS OF ISSUES IN PROPOSED FRG SALE TO SOVIET UNION. IKLE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE WORDING POSED AN UNINTENDED PROBLEM AND WAS INTENDED TO REFER TO COVERAGE AND DURATION, NOT TO THE COUNTRIES TO WHICH
IAEA SAFEGUARDS WOULD BE APPLIED. GOLDSCHMIDT THEN ASKED IF THE U.S. ENVISAGED RULING OUT BILATERAL SAFEGUARDS. HE NOTED THAT IN THE CASE OF TAIWAN, THE U.S. MIGHT PREFER BILATERAL RATHER THAN IAEA SAFEGUARDS ON POLITICAL GROUNDS THAT THE PRC OBJECTS TO MEMBERSHIP IN ANY ORGANIZATION DEALING WITH TAIWAN. FRENCH REFERRED TO THEIR PAST PRACTICE OF DECIDING THE QUESTION OF BILATERAL VS. IAEA SAFEGUARDS ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS.

5. ON POINT 3, SPECIAL RESTRAINT ON EXPORTS OF SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGY, E.G., ENRICHMENT OR REPROCESSING, GOLDSCHMIDT COMMENTED THAT REPROCESSING TECHNOLOGY HAS BEEN PUBLIC SINCE THE MID-1950'S, THAT MUCH OF THE EQUIPMENT IS EASILY OBTAINABLE AND THAT AT LEAST 20 TO 25 COUNTRIES COULD NOW BUILD REPROCESSING FACILITIES ON THEIR OWN. DE NAZELLE EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT SUCH SPECIAL RESTRAINTS WOULD DISCRIMINATE AGAINST THE LESS INDUSTRIALIZED NATIONS, FORCING THEM IN EFFECT TO ACCEPT NPT RESTRICTIONS. GOLDSCHMIDT THOUGHT THAT IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO RESTRICT THE FLOW OF TECHNICAL KNOWLEDGE. THE WRAPS
OF SECRECY, HE EXPLAINED, HAD BEEN REMOVED IN THE 1950's AND COULD NOT BE REPLACED. THE FRENCH WERE ALSO DISTURBED BY POSSIBLE RESTRICTIONS ON TRAINING OF STUDENTS IN SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGIES. GOLDSCHMIDT ASKED IF WESTERN GOVERNMENTS COULD LIMIT THE SPREAD OF TECHNOLOGY BY PRIVATE FIRMS. HE GAVE AS AN EXAMPLE THE DISCUSSIONS NOW GOING ON BETWEEN A GERMAN FIRM AND THE SOUTH AFRICANS ON URANIUM ENRICHMENT.

6. ON POINT 4 OF REF A PARA 5, PHYSICAL SECURITY, IKLE NOTED THAT NUCLEAR NATIONS COULD GAIN ADVANTAGES BY POOLING KNOWLEDGE AND TECHNOLOGY. HE SPOKE OF IMPROVEMENTS TO THE IAEA'S GREY BOOK, ESTABLISHING STANDARDS FOR PHYSICAL SECURITY, PERHAPS VERIFIABLE BY THE IAEA, AND THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURES TO PROTECT NUCLEAR SHIPMENTS. GOLDSCHMIDT QUESTIONED THE WISDOM OF TAKING MULTILATERAL STEPS THAT COULD PUBLICIZE THE METHODS OF PROTECTING NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS. HE WARNED THAT IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO RESTRICT INFORMATION AT THE IAEA, THAT IAEA INSPECTION WOULD INFRINGE ON RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE POLICE, AND THAT THERE WAS LITTLE LIKELIHOOD OF SABOTEURS OBTAINING WEAPONS-GRADE MATERIAL. DE NAZELLE RAISED THE POSSIBILITY OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION SUCH AS EXIST IN THE INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS AGAINST THE DRUG TRAFFIC. GOLDSCHMIDT NOTED THAT IT MIGHT BE EASIER TO STEAL ONE OF 7,000 U.S. WEAPONS IN EUROPE, AND SAID THE WHOLE CONCERN SEEMS "A BIT JAMES BONDISH AND UNREALISTIC" TO HIM.

7. ON POINT 5, CONCERNING EXPORTS TO SENSITIVE AREAS, THERE WAS GENERAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE AMBIGUITY INHERENT IN SUCH A DETERMINATION. GOLDSCHMIDT ASKED IF THESE RESTRICTIONS WOULD APPLY TO THE STATES WHO RETIRE FROM THE NPT OR WHO SUDDENLY REFUSE TO ADMIT IAEA INSPECTION.

8. DE NAZELLE STATED THAT THE FRENCH WERE NOT YET IN A POSITION TO GIVE AN OPINION ON THE PROPOSALS IN THE U.S. AIDE MEMOIRE. HIS BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE FRENCH POSITION ACCORDED GENERALLY WITH REF B. HE SAID HIS GOVERNMENT OBJECTED TO THE NPT BECAUSE IT DISCRIMINATED...
BETWEEN NNWS AND NWS. WAS NOT A REAL DETERRENT AGAINST NUCLEAR WARFARE, AND OFFERED NO PROTECTION TO NNWS. THE FRENCH SAFEGUARDS, THOUGH AUTONOMOUS, WERE CAREFUL AND STRINGENT, AS GOOD IN EFFECT AS THOSE OF OTHER NATIONS. FRANCE, HE CONTINUED, STROVE NOT TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR ANY NATION OBTAINING A NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY. HE OFFERED AS EVIDENCE THAT THE FRENCH IN THEIR NEGOTIATION OF AN AGREEMENT FOR SELLING REPROCESSING PLANTS TO THE PAKISTANIS AND SOUTH KOREANS ENVISAGED IAEA SAFEGUARDS. (COMMENT: THIS IS THE FIRST CONFIRMATION THE EMBASSY HAS RECEIVED OF THESE TWO DEALS. SEE PARA 11 BELOW.)

9. DE NAZELLE ADDED THAT IT WAS DIFFICULT FOR THE FRENCH TO THINK IN TERMS OF MULTILATERAL STRUCTURES. HOWEVER, THEY WERE ALWAYS WILLING TO HAVE BILATERAL TALKS AND TO DISCUSS PRACTICAL POINTS ABOUT THE SAFE-GUARDS PRACTICED BY OTHER COUNTRIES. HE REMAINED NEUTRAL ON THE POSSIBILITY OF THE NUCLEAR EXPORTING NATIONS DEVELOPING A "MODEL" AGREEMENT TO BE USED BY
ALL IN NEGOTIATING NUCLEAR EXPORTS. HE WAS CLEARLY HOSTILE TO THE POSSIBILITY, WHICH HE RAISED, OF A MULTILATERAL STRUCTURE DECIDING RULES AND APPLICATION OF THE RULES.

10. COMMERCIAL COMPETITION: FRENCH CONCERNS ABOUT POSSIBLE IMPACTS OF EXPORT CONTROLS ON COMMERCIAL COMPETITION, ALTHOUGH SUBMERGED DURING MOST OF THE DISCUSSION, CAME TO THE SURFACE MOST EXPLICITLY WHEN GOLDSCHMIDT ASKED VERY POINTEDLY HOW U.S. COULD EXPLAIN THE FACT THAT THE PROPOSED FRG SALE TO THE SOVIET UNION IS BEING HELD UP OVER SAFEGUARDS. HE ASKED, WAS THIS NOT "COMMERCIAL INTERFERENCE?" FRENCH SIDE SEEMED WELL-INFORMED ON THIS ISSUE, PARTICULARLY LA ROCHEFORDIERE OF QUAI.

11. REPROCESSING PLANTS PAKISTAN AND SOUTH KOREA: IN A PRIVATE CONVERSATION, MFA NUCLEAR EXPERT ALLINE, WHO HAD EARLIER DENIED EXISTENCE OF SOUTH KOREA DEAL TO SCIATT, WAS ASKED TO EXPLAIN STATEMENT DE NAZELLE SECRET

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MADE TO IKLE, THAT AGREEMENTS ON SAFEGUARDS FOR REPROCESSING PLANTS HAD ALREADY BEEN REACHED WITH SOUTH KOREA AS WELL AS PAKISTAN, BUT THAT CONTRACTS HAD NOT BEEN SIGNED. FROM ALLINE'S REPLY IT APPEARS THAT NEGOTIATIONS BEGAN WITH PAKISTAN IN 1970 ON AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE THAT FRENCH- BUILT REPROCESSING PLANT IN PAKISTAN WOULD BE SUBJECT TO SAFEGUARDS. NEGOTIATIONS TOOK A COUPLE OF YEARS TILL PAKISTAN AGREED TO IAEA SAFEGUARDS. NEGOTIATIONS ON AGREEMENT WITH IAEA THEN FOLLOWED, AND NOW PAKISTAN STILL HAS TO WORK OUT NECESSARY FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS. THOUGH ALLINE IS VAGUE, IT APPEARS THAT ONLY FORMALITY OF CONTRACT SIGNATURE REMAINS. SIMILAR PROCESS HAS TAKEN PLACE WITH SOUTH KOREA, WITH DIFFERENCES THAT DISCUSSIONS ARE LESS ADVANCED AND AGREEMENT WITH IAEA WILL NOT BE A GENERAL ONE BUT WILL COVER ONLY REPROCESSING PLANT. ALLINE WAS VAGUE ON POINT OF WHEN DISCUSSIONS WITH KOREANS BEGAN. (COMMENT: DURING DISCUSSIONS WITH IKLE IN VIENNA, IAEA INSPECTOR GENERAL ROMETSCH SAID VERY LITTLE IS KNOWN YET ABOUT HOW ANY REPROCESSING PLANT MIGHT BE SAFEGUARDED. THESE ARE VERY DIFFICULT TECHNICAL PROBLEMS STILL TO BE SOLVED.)

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