

Message Text

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PAGE 01 STATE 085585
ORIGIN NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 /001 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/PAB:JCOON:CHG

APPROVED BY THE SECRETARY

NEA - MR SAUNDERS

/P - PKREISBERG (INFO)

S/S :SSTAPLETON

NSC - BRZEZINSKI

P:MR NEWSOM

OES - MR PICKERING

-----098550 061940Z /41

O P 061917Z APR 79 ZFF6

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE

INFO WHITE HOUSE PRIORITY 0000

S E C R E T STATE 085585

NODIS

FOR THE AMBASSADOR

E.O. 12065: GDS (4/6/85, COON, JANE)

TAGS: PINT, PK

SUBJECT: INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE AMBASSADOR'S MEETING
WITH PRESIDENT ZIA

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. BACKGROUND: IN THIS INTERVIEW WITH ZIA YOU WILL
SEEK TO LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR A MULTI-PRONGED POLICY
APPROACH TOWARD PAKISTAN. THIS APPROACH WILL WORK ON
TWO LEVELS. THE FIRST LEVEL WILL INVOLVE OUR CONTINU-
ING STRENUOUS ATTEMPTS TO PREVENT PAKISTAN FROM DE-
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VELOPING A NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE CAPABILITY. THIS WILL
INCLUDE (1) MULTILATERAL EFFORTS TO DISSUADE PAKISTAN
AND TO FRUSTRATE ITS ATTEMPTS TO FIND NECESSARY SUP-
PLIES FOR ITS PROGRAM, AND (2) ENFORCEMENT OF THE
SYMINGTON AMENDMENT AND OTHER LEGISLATION APPLICABLE
TO PAKISTAN AS LONG AS IT PURSUES ITS NUCLEAR OPTION.
AT THE SAME TIME, WE WILL ON ANOTHER LEVEL SEEK TO

INSULATE THIS NEGATIVE ASPECT OF OUR RELATIONSHIP FROM OTHER ASPECTS THAT ARE IMPORTANT TO BOTH PAKISTAN AND OURSELVES. THESE INCLUDE (1) SUPPORT FOR PAKISTAN IN THE FACE OF THE THREAT FROM THE SOVIET UNION AND AFGHANISTAN, AND (2) INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION.

IN THIS APPROACH WE NEED TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE PAKISTANI APPROACH ON AFGHANISTAN IS TACTICAL, IN ORDER TO GET US TO MOVE AWAY FROM OUR NON-PROLIFERATION EMPHASIS, OR REPRESENTS A GENUINE CONCERN OVER THE GROWING SOVIET PRESENCE. IF THE LATTER IS THE CASE, WE WANT TO BUILD UPON THAT AND SEEK TO INSULATE THAT DIMENSION OF OUR RELATIONSHIP TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE FROM THE DIFFICULTIES WE WILL HAVE OVER NON-PROLIFERATION.

WE WOULD THEN HOPE TO DEVELOP AN UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT THEY WOULD FEEL REPRESENTED A LEVEL OF U.S. SUPPORT SUFFICIENT TO MEET THEIR STRATEGIC AND POLITICAL CONCERNS. IN THIS CONNECTION, INFORMATION ON PAK ATTITUDES BEARING ON THE POSSIBILITY OF A FREEZE ON THE ENRICHMENT PROGRAM AND POSSIBLE DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES TO AVOID ULTIMATE NUCLEAR WEAPONS PRODUCTION WOULD BE HELPFUL.

TALKING POINTS:

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1. I HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED BY THE PRESIDENT TO MEET WITH YOU IN ORDER TO DISCUSS OUR VIEWS ON THE SERIOUS SECURITY SITUATION IN THE REGION AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE 1959 BILATERAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES. WHILE ON CONSULTATION, I REVIEWED AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS IN WASHINGTON THE FULL RANGE OF OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS, AND I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT IS ADDRESSING THE PROBLEMS WE FACE TOGETHER WITH THE UTMOST SERIOUSNESS.

2. THE CHARGE HAS REAFFIRMED TO AGHA SHAHI THE FACT THAT WE CONSIDER THE 1959 BILATERAL AGREEMENT OF COOPERATION TO BE IN FORCE. AS YOU KNOW, THE AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED IN A CONTEXT WHICH RELATED PARTICULARLY TO ARMED AGGRESSION FROM ANY COUNTRY CONTROLLED BY INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM AND WE CONSIDER IT RELEVANT TO THE THREAT POSED BY THE SOVIET UNION IN THE AFGHAN SITUATION. (IF PRESSED FOR SPECIFICS YOU SHOULD SAY THAT PRECISE USG ACTIONS ARE DIFFICULT TO DEFINE IN THE ABSENCE OF FURTHER DISCUSSION REGARDING THE NATURE OF THE THREAT.)

2A. WE BELIEVE THAT AN EXTREMELY IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF YOUR DEFENSE LIES IN PAKISTAN'S POLITICAL STABILITY, INTERNAL COHESION AND ECONOMIC AND MILITARY STRENGTH. YOU SHOULD UNDERSTAND, HOWEVER, THAT OUR ABILITY TO PROVIDE DIRECT ASSISTANCE IN DEALING WITH TRIBAL

INSURGENCIES INSIDE PAKISTAN IS VERY LIMITED.

3. WE ARE PREPARED, IF YOU WISH, TO MAKE A SERIOUS AMERICAN DEMARCHE IN MOSCOW, SIMILAR TO THE SOVIET DEMARCHE IN ISLAMABAD, IN WHICH WE WOULD POINT TO THE IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO THE 1959 AGREEMENT OF COOPERATION WITH PAKISTAN, AND OUR VIEW THAT THE
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DURAND LINE IS THE RECOGNIZED INTERNATIONAL BORDER.

4. WE ARE PREPARED PROMPTLY TO CONSIDER VISITS BY U.S. INDIAN OCEAN SHIPS TO PAKISTANI PORTS AND WOULD BE INTERESTED IN ZIA'S VIEWS ON THIS.

5. WE ARE PREPARED TO CONSULT ON THE NATURE OF THE THREAT POSED BY SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN'S SECURITY POSITION VIS-A-VIS AFGHANISTAN AND THE USSR. WE ARE PREPARED TO BRING EXPERTS TO ISLAMABAD FOR SUCH CONSULTATIONS, AS ENVISIONED BY THE 1959 AGREEMENT.

6. BEYOND THESE MEASURES, WE WANT TO PROVIDE YOU WITH THE KIND OF SUPPORT THAT CAN CONTRIBUTE TO YOUR DOMESTIC STRENGTH IN THE FACE OF THE HEIGHTENED THREAT FROM AFGHANISTAN AND THE USSR. WE ARE PREPARED TO REVIEW URGENTLY THE POSSIBILITY OF A SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN ECONOMIC AID. YOU MIGHT WANT TO CONSIDER WHETHER SOME OF THAT AID MIGHT USEFULLY BE DIRECTED TOWARDS BALUCHISTAN AND THE FRONTIER AS A TANGIBLE SIGNAL THAT WE ARE COMMITTED TO THE INTEGRITY OF PAKISTAN AND HAVE A DIRECT INTEREST IN BOTH PROVINCES.

7. AS WE HAVE SAID BEFORE, HOWEVER, YOUR EFFORTS IN THE NUCLEAR ENRICHMENT AND REPROCESSING FIELDS PRESENT A VERY SERIOUS BARRIER TO OUR FURNISHING SIGNIFICANT AID BECAUSE OF OUR LAWS. OUR RECENT CONVERSATIONS WITH YOU AND OUR ASSESSMENT OF YOUR CURRENT ACTIVITIES GIVE US NO CHOICE BUT TO COMPLY WITH THE LAW. THE CONSTRAINTS IMPOSED BY YOUR NUCLEAR PROGRAM ON OUR ABILITY TO HELP YOU HAVE NOT CHANGED SINCE SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER'S VISIT. I

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DO NOT EXPECT THAT THEY WILL CHANGE.

8. ANY FUTURE DISCUSSIONS MUST INEVITABLY CONSIDER THE QUESTION OF THE STRATEGIC VALUE OF A NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPACITY, AS WELL AS THE DEGREE TO WHICH THE PURSUIT OF A WEAPONS OPTION CREATES SERIOUS PROBLEMS IN OUR BILATERAL SECURITY COOPERATION.

9. OUR NATIONAL INTERESTS COINCIDE IN WISHING TO LIMIT THE EXTENSION OF SOVIET INFLUENCE IN THIS CRUCIAL REGION. ON THE OTHER HAND, YOU MUST RECOGNIZE THE DILEMMA CREATED BY THE FACT THAT FURTHER PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD ADVERSELY AFFECT OUR NATIONAL SECURITY AS WELL AS GLOBAL AND REGIONAL STABILITY.

10. FINALLY, WE WOULD BE WILLING TO WORK WITH YOU AND OTHER COUNTRIES, BOTH WITHIN AND WITHOUT THE REGION, TO SEEK TO ENSURE THAT YOU WILL NOT BE THREATENED BY THE DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY OTHERS IN YOUR REGION. IN THIS CONNECTION WE WELCOME YOUR THOUGHTS AS TO THE KIND OF ARRANGEMENTS PAKISTAN WOULD FEEL MEET ITS SECURITY CONCERNS IN THIS RESPECT.

11. THERE ARE OTHER AREAS IN WHICH WE MIGHT CO-OPERATE FOR OUR MUTUAL BENEFIT. MY GOVERNMENT MOST EARNESTLY HOPES THAT A REASSESSMENT OF YOUR MOST FUNDAMENTAL SECURITY INTERESTS WILL PERMIT US TO WORK TOGETHER PRODUCTIVELY TO MEET THE THREAT TO REGIONAL PEACE AND STABILITY.

12(IF RAISED BY ZIA) WE APPRECIATE THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN INCLUDING THE ACTIONS OF THE AFGHAN INSURGENTS, DIRECTED AS THEY ARE AGAINST A SOVIET-MAINTAINED REGIME. THE QUESTIONS THAT YOU HAVE RAISED ON THIS QUESTION

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INFO AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0000

S E C R E T STATE 085585

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FOLLOWING REPEAT STATE 85585 ACTION ISLAMABAD INFO WHITE HOUSE
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QUOTE S E C R E T STATE 085585

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UNQUOTE VANCE

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Message Attributes

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Concepts: INSTRUCTIONS, PRESIDENT, FOREIGN RELATIONS, INTERVENTION, CAT-C, AMBASSADORS, MEETINGS, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION, FOREIGN ASSISTANCE, NUCLEAR COOPER ATION PROGRAMS, INVASIONS
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Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 06 apr 1979
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Disposition Approved on Date:
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Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
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TAGS: PINT, PEPR, MNUC, PK, US, (ZIA-UL-HAQ, MOHAMMAD), (HUMMEL, ARTHUR W JR)
To: ISLAMABAD WHITE HOUSE
Type: TE
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Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
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