CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01  KABUL 07784 01 OF 02  301156Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ADS-00 EA-10 PM-06 NSC-05 SP-02
   SS-15 CIAE-00 INR-10 NSAE-00 DODE-00 SMS-01 /073 W
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P R 300949Z OCT 79
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
SESTATE WASHDC 6137
CINCPAC
USMISSION USNATO

C O N F I D E N T I A L
SECTION 1 OF 2 KABUL 7784

CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12065: GDS 10/29/85 (FLATIN, BRUCE A.) OR-M
TAGS: MOPS, PEPR, PINR, AF, UR, TU
SUBJ: (C) TURKISH INFORMATION ON THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN

REF: ANKARA 7966 (NOTAL)

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. PURSUANT TO EMBASSY ANKARA'S REQUEST IN PARAGRAPH 10 OF
   THE REFTEL, THIS EMBASSY HAS THE FOLLOWING OBSERVATIONS TO
   MAKE ABOUT THE POINTS DISCUSSED BY KARAOSMANOGLU:
   (A) AMIN-SOVIET STRAINS: ALTHOUGH THERE HAVE BEEN INDICA-
       TIONS IN THE PAST THAT THE SOVIETS MIGHT HAVE PREFERRED SOME
       OTHER POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THE UNSTABLE AFGHAN SITUATION THAN
       THE CONTINUED LEADERSHIP OF THE RUTHLESS AND UNPOPULAR
       HAFIZULLAH AMIN, MOSCOW IS NOW CLEARLY STUCK WITH HIM, AT
       LEAST FOR THE SHORT RUN. WE AGREE WITH KARAOSMANOGLU THAT THE
       SOVIETS ARE NOW UNDOUBTEDLY GUIDING AMIN TO FOLLOW A MODERATE
       COURSE IN ORDER TO BROADEN, IF AT ALL POSSIBLE, HIS OWN BASE OF
       SUPPORT. WE ALSO FOUND THE ABSENCE OF AMBASSADOR PUZANOV FROM
       FOREIGN MINISTER SHAH WALI'S UNUSUAL OCTOBER 6 BRIEFING A
       POSSIBLE INDICATIONS THAT THE SOVIET ROLE ON SEPTEMBER 14

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02  KABUL 07784 01 OF 02  301156Z

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POSSIBLE INDICATIONS THAT THE SOVIET ROLE ON SEPTEMBER 14
COULD HAVE BEEN REGARDED AS ANTI-AMIN. HOWEVER, IN A RECENT CONVERSATION WITH A SOUTH ASIAN DIPLOMAT, SOVIET MINISTER-CONSELSOR SAFRONCHUK TRIED TO DOWNPLAY PUZANOV'S SEPTEMBER 14 ROLE, DESCRIBING IT AS AN EFFORT TO PRESERVE PEACE BETWEEN THE WARRING Factions OF THE AFGHAN PARTY. ON OCTOBER 29, PUZANOV PRAISED AMIN HIGHLY TO BRITISH AMBASSADOR-DESIGNATE HILLIER-FRY. (WE SHOULD ADD THAT THERE ARE SOME OFFICERS IN THIS EMBASSY WHO BELIEVE THAT PAST TALK OF STRAINS BETWEEN AMIN AND THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN A "SHELL GAME" -- AND THAT THE TOUGH STRONGMAN HAS BEEN MOSCOW'S MAN SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE KHALQI ERA.)

AMIN'S REFERENCE TO "DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT" IN HIS OCTOBER 10 SPEECH IS NOT NEW. HE AND FORMER PRESIDENT TARAKI HAVE OCCASIONALLY USED THIS TERM IN THE PAST. HIS STATEMENT THAT "...ALL THE IMPORTANT AREAS OF PRODUCTION WILL BE CONSIDERED PUBLIC PROPERTY" WAS MADE IN THE CONTEXT OF ASSURING THE CONTINUED SECURITY OF PRIVATE PROPERTY (A PROMISE FREQUENTLY MADE BY THE KHALQI LEADERSHIP TO AFGHANISTAN'S "NATIONAL CAPITALISTS"), WHILE THREATENING TO DEPRIVE POSSESSORS OF "SOCIAL PRODUCTS" FROM "THE POWER TO SUBJECT THE LABOR OF OTHERS THROUGH PRIVATE OWNERSHIP THEREOF." THIS FORMULATION ALSO REPEATS A THEME WE HAVE HEARD HERE BEFORE.

(B) ASYLUM: WE DO NOT THINK THE THREE EXPELLED MILITARY MINISTERS ARE STILL WITHIN THE SOVIET EMBASSY, IF, INDEED, THEY HAD ONCE SOUGHT PROTECTION THERE. THE MOST COMMONLY HELD LOCAL VIEW IS THAT WATANJAR, PERHAPS ACCOMPANIED BY GULABZOI, IS IN HIS HOME PROVINCE OF PAKTIA. SAFRONCHUK RECENTLY TOLD A SOUTH ASIAN DIPLOMAT THAT TH em Pair IS "STILL AT LARGE." THEY ARE BELIEVED BY SEVERAL LOCAL OBSERVERS TO BE TRYING TO ESTABLISH THEMSELVES WITH DISAFFECTED MILITARY FORCES IN SOUTHEASTERN AFGHANISTAN. IT IS ALSO POSSIBLE THAT WATANJAR AND GULABZOI MAY BE IN THE USSR SO THAT THE SOVIETS COULD KEEP THEIR ACTIVITIES UNDER CONTROL, ALTHOUGH A HIGH SOVIET EMBASSY OFFICER DENIED THIS TO CHARGE AMSTUTZ ON OCTOBER 3 (KABUL 7318). MANY BELIEVE MAZDOORYAR TO BE DEAD, BUT A SOUTH ASIAN DIPLOMAT STATES THAT HE WAS RECENTLY TOLD BY SAFRONCHUK THAT MAZDOORYAR IS BEING KEPT UNDER HOUSE ARREST IN HIS QUARTERS AT THE PUL-I-CHARKI TANK BASE. IF THIS IS TRUE, HE WOULD PROBABLY BE UNDER SOVIET PROTECTION FROM AMIN (THE SOVIETS PROBABLY NOW CONTROL THAT BASE), WHO WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY HAVE HIM KILLED IMMEDIATELY IF HE COULD BE BROUGHT UNDER KHALQI CONTROL. THE SOVIET MOTIVE IN SUCH A SITUATION COULD BE TO MAINTAIN LEVERAGE AGAINST AMIN, WHO MUST BE PAINFULLY AWARE OF THE EXILED AFGHAN LEADERSHIP THE SOVIETS ARE KEEPING ON THE SHELF (E.G., THE PARCHAMISTS).
(C) PUZANOV: JUDGING FROM SHAH WALI'S WELL-REPORTED REMARKS TO THE EASTERN EUROPEAN DIPLOMATS ON OCTOBER 6, WE ALSO BELIEVE THAT PUZANOV WAS PROBABLY AT THE PALACE AT LEAST IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO THE SHOOTOUT -- IF NOT THROUGHOUT THE EPISODE. WE ALSO THINK IT PLAUSIBLE THAT TARAKI MIGHT HAVE BECOME A TARGET OF OPPORTUNITY PREMATURELY FOR AMIN AT THAT TIME -- AND THAT THE LATTER MIGHT NOT HAVE ORIGINALLY SCHEDULED THE "GREAT LEADER'S" DEMISE DURING THIS PARTICULAR PURGE OPERATION. WE ARE NOT AWARE OF ANY "RECALCITRANT MINISTER" HAVING BEEN EXECUTED AT THE PALACE IN THE PREVIOUS YEAR. TO WHOM WAS KARAOSMANOGLU REFERRING? (FORMER DEFENSE MINISTER ABDUL QADER, WHO WAS TRICKED INTO COMING TO THE PALACE -- WHERE HE WAS ARRESTED, IS BELIEVED TO STILL BE ALIVE AT PUL-I-CHARKI PRISON.)

(D) ETEMADI: AFTER WEIGHING SEVERAL RELIABLE REPORTS, WE TOO HAVE SADLY CONCLUDED THAT FORMER PRIME MINISTER NUR AHMAD ETEMADI HAS INDEED BEEN EXECUTED. ALTHOUGH THE AMIN REGIME CONFIDENTIAL

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AFTER AMIN’S SEPTEMBER 14 TAKEOVER, THE CONSTANT REPORTS ABOUT SOVIET PLANS TO UTILIZE ETMADI FOR A POLITICAL ALTERNATIVE TO AMIN APPARENTLY SEALED THE OLD MAN’S FATE.

(E) SAMS AT BAGRAM: BAGRAM AIRBASE IS UNDER SOVIET CONTROL, AND AMIN IS, THEREFORE, NOT ABLE TO HAVE ANY SPECIAL WEAPONS INSTALLED THERE WITHOUT SOVIET CONCURRENCE AND SUPPORT. THE AFGHANS HAVE HAD SAMS SINCE THE DAOUDIST ERA, PRESUMABLY TO CONTEND PARTIALLY WITH THE RELATIVE SUPERIORITY OF THE PAKISTANI AIR FORCE. THERE IS NO INDICATION, INCIDENTALLY, THAT THE AFGHAN AIR FORCE, WHICH IS, IN EFFECT, SOVIET-CONTROLLED, REPRESENTS ANY IMMEDIATE THREAT TO AMIN AS LONG AS THE SOVIETS DESIRE TO SEE HIM REMAIN IN POWER.

(F) PURGES: CHIEF OF STAFF YAQOUB DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE IN ANY POLITICAL TROUBLE AT THE IMMEDIATE TIME. IN FACT, HE WAS RECENTLY NAMED TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE RULING PARTY. PUBLIC WORKS MINISTER PANJSHIRI, WHO IS BELIEVED TO ONCE HAVE HAD PARCHAMIST LEANINGS, INDEED DID LEAVE FOR MOSCOW FOR “MEDICAL TREATMENT” AFTER AMIN’S COUP, AND HAS NOT BEEN MENTIONED SINCE IN THE MEDIA. HE COULD WELL BECOME A VICTIM OF THE NEXT ROUND OF PURGES. IN SUCH A CASE, THE SOVIETS COULD POSSIBLY ALSO OFFER HIM REFUGE ON THEIR “RESERVE SHELF.”

3. PLEASE CONVEY TO KARAOSMANOGLU THE GREETINGS OF HIS AMERICAN EMBASSY COLLEAGUES WHO REMEMBER HIM FONDLY FROM HIS DAYS AS TURKISH CHARGE AT KABUL.

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