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STATE FOR EA/J; USIA FOR IBS

E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: OREP (KENNEDY, EDWARD) CH JA
SUBJECT: CODEL KENNEDY

1. SENATOR KENNEDY REQUESTS FOLLOWING BE PASSED TO HIS
OFFICE: HIROSHIMA SPEECH WILL BE RELEASED HERE EMBARGOED
UNTIL 1:30 P.M. JAPAN TIME JANUARY 11, 1978. PLEASE RELEASE
IN WASHINGTON, OBSERVING SAME EMBARGO TIME. COPIES SHOULD BE
PASSED TO APPROPRIATE CORRESPONDENTS. FOLLOWING IS REVISED
TEXT (NO CHANGE NECESSARY IN SHORT PRESS RELEASE AS ORIGINALLY
PREPARED).

2. SPEECH OF SENATOR EDWARD M. KENNEDY
AT HIROSHIMA, HIROSHIMA UNIVERSITY, JAPAN-AMERICA SOCIETY,
JANUARY 11, 1978. BEGIN REVISED TEXT:

IT IS A GREAT HONOR FOR ME TO SPEAK HERE TODAY, IN
HIROSHIMA, A CITY WHICH HAS EXPERIENCED APPALLING DESTRUCTION
BUT ALSO MAGNIFICENT RECOVERY.

IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO VISIT HIROSHIMA WITHOUT
FEELING A DEEP OBLIGATION TO AVOID THE HOLOCAUST
WHICH TWICE VISITED JAPAN. IN HIS NOVEL, BLACK
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RAIN, THE GREAT WRITER MASUJI IBUSE CHARACTERIZED
THE NUCLEAR EXPLOSION AS:

"MORE LIKE A JELLYFISH THAN A MUSHROOM--
WRITHING AND RAGING AS THOUGH IT MIGHT HURL ITSELF
ON OUR HEADS AT ANY MOMENT. IT WAS AN ENVOY OF THE
DEVIL ITSELF, I DECIDED: WHO EISE IN THE WHOLE WIDE
UNIVERSE WOULD HAVE PRESUMED TO SUMMON FORTH SUCH A
MONSTROSITY?"

THIS CITY STANDS AS MORE THAN A MONUMENT TO
MASSIVE DEATH AND DESTRUCTION. IT STANDS AS A
LIVING TESTAMENT TO THE NECESSITY FOR PROGRESS
TOWARD NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT--FOR PREVENTING THE
SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND FOR PROGRESSIVELY
REDUCING THEIR NUMBERS IN THE FEW COUNTRIES THAT
HAVE THEM TODAY.

WE MUST ALL REDITICATE OURSELVES TO FORESTALL-
ING THE DESTRUCTIVE APPLICATION OF NUCLEAR ENERGY--
NOT MERELY FOR REASONS OF STRATEGY BUT FOR REASONS
OF HUMANITY. THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE OF THE PAST 25
YEARS IS A TRAGIC STORY OF CONTINUING FOLLY IN THE
FACE OF THE LESSONS OF HISTORY.

TO ITS HISTORIC CREDIT, JAPAN HAS LONG BEEN
COMMITTED TO THE OBJECTIVE OF ELIMINATING NUCLEAR
WEAPONS FROM THIS EARTH. IT HAS SET A LEADING
EXAMPLE THROUGH ITS THREE NON-NUCLEAR PRINCIPLES
AND ITS COMMITMENT NEVER AGAIN TO BECOME AN
OFFENSIVE MILITARY POWER.

THE WORLD HAS BUT TO LEARN FROM JAPAN'S RE-
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EMERGENCE AS A POWER THAT EXPRESS ITS GREATNESS
IN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL RATHER THAN IN MILITARY
TERMS. LIKE MANY STATES, JAPAN IS SURROUNDED BY
HEAVILY MILITARIZED NEIGHBORS. YET, UNLIKE MOST
MAJOR NATIONS, JAPAN HAS ACHIEVED ITS GREATNESS
WITHOUT MAINTAINING A LARGE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT.

TO BE SURE, THIS ACCOMPLISHMENT HAS DEPENDED
SUBSTANTIALLY ON CONTINUED INTERNATIONAL STABILITY,
ON BOTH THE STRATEGIC AND CONVENTIONAL MILITARY
LEVELS. WE ENJOY A STRATEGIC BALANCE BETWEEN THE
UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION. WE ENJOY A
REGIONAL BALANCE IN EUROPE AS WELL AS IN THE FAR
EAST. THE UNITED STATES IS COMMITTED TO MAINTAIN-
ING THIS BALANCE ON WHICH PEACE CONTINUES TO DEPEND.
WE PLACE A VERY HIGH VALUE ON THE U.S.-JAPAN
SECURITY TREATY WHICH IS THE FOUNDATION OF OUR
POLICY IN EAST ASIA.

BUT STABILITY CANNOT BE AN END IN ITSELF. IT
MUST BE THE CONTEXT FOMOVING TO REDUCE MILITARY
FORCES, NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL. THUS I WELCOME
THE NEGOTIATION OF A SALT II AGREEMENT ARRESTING
THE STRATEGIC ARMS RACE, BUT I LOOK FORWARD EVEN
MORE TO A SALT III AGREEMENT WHICH WILL REVERSE
THIS RACE.

AT LONG LAST, THE U.S., UK AND USSR AND COMPLE-
TING NEGOTIATIONS ON A COMPREHENSIVE BAN ON ALL
NUCLEAR TESTING. FOR SEVERAL YEARS, I HAVE SPONSOR-
ED A RESOLUTION IN THE SENATE SUPPORTING A COMPRE-
HENSIVE TEST BAN. JAPAN HAS LONG ADVOCATED SUCH A
BAN. WE BOTH CAN LOOK WITH SATISFACTION TO THE
COMPLETION OF THE PROCESS THAT BEGAN WITH THE LIMIT-
ED NUCLEAR TEST BAN UNDER PRESIDENT KENNEDY.

I RECOGNIZE THAT, AT ITS OUTSET, A COMPREHENSIVE
TEST BAN MAY NOT ATTRACT THE SUPPORT OF ALL THE
NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES. EVEN SO, IT WILL BE AN
IMPORTANT STEP FORWARD, ONE WHICH I BELIEVE MOST
NATIONS WILL ACCEPT IMMEDIATELY AND WHICH I HOPE ALL
NATIONS WILL ACCEPT EVENTUALLY. FOR THOSE WHO WILL
NOT ACCEPT THE COMPREHENSIVE BAN IMMEDIATELY, I HOPE
THAT THEY WILL ADHERE TO THE LIMITED TEST BAN TREATY,
OR AT LEAST DECIDE UNILATERALLY TO ABANDON ALL
NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS IN THE ATMOSPHERE.

NEVER AGAIN SHOULD BLACK RAIN FALL.

UNFORTUNATELY, NEITHER LIMITING STRATEGIC ARMS

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NOR BANNING NUCLEAR TESTS WILL GUARANTEE THAT WE CAN REDUCE RATHER THAN INCREASE THE NUMBER OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE WORLD. MUCH MORE IS NEEDED TO PREVENT THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE CAPABILITIES.

WE WERE SHARPLY REMINDED OF THIS FACT WITH THE DETONATION OF A NUCLEAR DEVICE BY INDIA IN 1974. THIS EXPLOSION DRAMATIZED THE DANGER THAT NUCLEAR ENERGY DEVELOPED FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES COULD BE $8,345.35—UNLESS IT IS PROPERLY CONTROLLED—TO CONSTRUCT NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES.

AT THE SAME TIME, INTERNATIONAL DEMAND FOR NUCLEAR POWER HAS INCREASED GEOMETRICALLY WITH THE QUADRUPLING OF OIL PRICES SINCE THE 1973 OPEC EMBARGO. AS NUCLEAR FACILITIES SPREAD WORLDWIDE, THE POTENTIAL FOR NUCLEAR CATASTROPHE ALSO INCREASES. WE ARE ALL AWARE OF HOW THESE PLANTS CAN ENDANGER THE ENVIRONMENT, BECAME TARGETS FOR TERRORISTS, AND TEMPT A GOVERNMENT TO MANUFACTURE NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

THIS AUDIENCE, IN THIS PLACE, UNDERSTANDS WELL THE DANGERS OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION.

BOTH OF OUR COUNTRIES DEPEND TOO MUCH ON OIL IMPORTS FROM OPEC COUNTRIES. BUT JAPAN'S DEPENDENCE ON OUTSIDE ENERGY SOURCES IS GREATER THAN ANY OTHER INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRY. IF 22 PCT OF AMERICAN ENERGY NEEDS ARE PRESENTLY MET BY IMPORTED OIL, 73 PCT OF JAPANESE NEEDS DEPEND ON IMPORTED OIL. SO I AM ESPECIALLY CONSCIOUS OF JAPAN'S NEED FOR ENERGY SECURITY.

IT IS IN OUR STRONG NATIONAL INTEREST TO REDUCE THIS UNACCEPTABLE DEPENDENCE ON OUTSIDE ENERGY SOURCES, AS WELL AS TO REDUCE OUR OVERALL ENERGY CONSUMPTION. WE IN THE UNITED STATES HAVE A SPECIAL OBLIGATION AS THE WORLD'S MOST CONSPICUOUS AND WASTEFUL CONSUMERS OF FOSSIL FUELS.

IT IS CLEAR, MOREOVER, THAT ADVANCED ENERGY
SOURCES--SUCH AS SOLAR, GEOTHERMAL, WIND AND BIO-CONVERSION--WILL NOT PROVIDE ADEQUATE ENERGY SECURITY FOR THE REMAINDER OF THIS CENTURY. Y THE YEAR 2000, EVEN THE MOST OPTIMISTIC ESTIMATES ARE THAT THESE SOURCES WILL PROVIDE ONLY MARGINAL AMOUNTS OF ENERGY.

WE SHOULD DO OUR OUTMOST TO DEVELOP THESE ALTERNATIVE SOURCES. I WELCOME THE BILATERAL EFFORTS UNDERWAY BETWEEN JAPANESE GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND THE AMERICAN DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, AND THE MULTILATERAL EFFORTS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE EVALUATION PROGRAM. I BELIEVE THEY SHOULD BE EXPANDED AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE, WITH MORE RESOURCES Devoted TO THIS TASK.

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BUT THE IMPLACABLE REALITY REMAINS: OVER THE NEXT FEW DECADES WE HAVE NO ACCEPTABLE ALTERNATIVE TO INCREASED RELIANCE ON NUCLEAR ENERGY. WITH THE BENEFITS THAT NUCLEAR ENERGY IMPLIES COME THE DANGERS OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE THAT IT ENTAILS. WE ARE THUS CONFRONTED POTENTIALLY WITH A TERRIBLE DILEMMA BETWEEN DIMINISHED ENERGY SECURITY AND INCREASED NUCLEAR INSECURITY.

FORTUNATELY, IT IS POSSIBLE TO DISCERN A REASONABLE WAY OUT OF THIS DILEMMA, WHICH Responds TO OUR ESSENTIAL ENERGY NEEDS AS WELL AS TO THE IMPERATIVE TO AVOID NUCLEAR CATACSTROPHE. TO SUCCEED, THIS WAY OUT MUST COMBINE BOTH TECHNICAL AND POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS AGAINST NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION.

HISTORICALLY, THE MOST IMPORTANT CONSTRAINTS HAVE BEEN THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT) AND THE NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM AD INISTERED BY THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA). WE ARE BOTH MEMBERS OF THE IAEA AND PARTIES TO THE NPT. COMPREHENSIVE AND EFFECTIVE SAFEGUARDS ARE INDISPENSABLE TO PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN AND SUPPORT FOR PEACEFUL NUCLEAR POWER--AND RIGHLY SO. WE MUST STRIVE FOR MAXIMUM SUPPORT FOR INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS AND UNIVERSAL ADHERENCE TO THE NPT--WHICH COMBINES POLITICAL COMMITMENTS NOT TO ACQUIRE OR TRANSFER NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES WITH ACCEPTANCE OF IAEA SAFEGUARDS OVER ALL CIVIL NUCLEAR FACILITIES IN STATES PARTY TO THE TREATY.
WHILE IMPORTANT, THESE CONSTRAINTS ARE NOT 
SUFFICIENT. IT WOULD BE AN EXTREMELY SERIOUS ACT,
BUT A SUFFICIENTLY DETERMINED OR DESPERATE GOV-
ERNMENT COULD WITHDRAW FROM THE TREATY AND USE ITS
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NUCLEAR MATERIALS FOR WEAPONS PURPOSES. SUBNATIONAL
GROUPS COULD SEIZE NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE MATERIALS
WITH THE SAME PURPOSE IN MIND.

THESE RISKS FORCE ALL RESPONSIBLE PEOPLE TO FOCUS
ON THE NATURE OF THE NUCLEAR FACILITIES AND NUCLEAR
MATERIALS THEMSELVES. TO DATE, JAPAN AND THE UNITED
STATES HAVE RELIED ON CONVENTIONAL NUCLEAR POWER
ReactORS USING LOW ENRICHED URANIUM FUEL. NEITHER
THE FUEL NOR THE PRODUCT OF THE REACTORS CAN BE USED
DIRECTLY TO MAKE NUCLEAR BOMBS.

HOWEVER, HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM AND PLUTONIUM
CAN BE USED DIRECTLY TO MAKE NUCLEAR BOMBS. THEY CAN
ALSO BE USED AS FUEL FOR NUCLEAR REACTORS, INCLUDING
THE SO-CALLED BREEDER REACTOR WHICH CAN RE-GENERATE THE
FUEL IT USES. THERE ARE NO SAFEGUARDS PRESENTLY
AVAILABLE WHICH CAN DETECT DIVERSION OF THESE SENSITIVE

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MATERIALS FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS PURPOSES IN SUFFICIENT
TIME FOR EFFECTIVE COUNTER-ACTION BY THE INTER-
NATIONAL COMMUNITY.

THIS IS WHY BOTH JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES OPPOSE THE EXPORT OF SENSITIVE NUCLEAR FACILITIES, IN CONTRAST TO THE EXPORT OF CONVENTIONAL NUCLEAR REACTORS AND FUEL. THIS IS WHY WE HAVE BOTH DEFERRED COMMERCIAL REPROCESSING TO PRODUCE PLUTONIUM--AND UNDERTAKEN TO EVALUATE FUEL CYCLE ALTERNATIVES THAT CAN OFFER INCREASED RESISTANCE TO NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION. THIS IS ALSO WHY WE HAVE BOTH PARTICIPATED IN THE NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS' GROUP IN LONDON--TO STRENGTHEN NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS AND CONTROLS AND REMOVE THEM FROM COMMERCIAL COMPETITION. AND THIS UNDERScores WHY WE HAVE BOTH ENGAGED IN THE INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE EVALUATION--TO MAKE THE NEXT GENERATION OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY AT LEAST AS SAFE AS THE EXISTING GENERATION.

IT IS CLEAR, THEN, THAT NEITHER OF OUR COUNTRIES SUPPORTS THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS MATERIALS OR THE SENSITIVE PLANTS WHICH PRODUCE THEM. BOTH OF OUR COUNTRIES SUPPORT STRONG NUCLEAR CONTROLS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE IAEA AND THE NPT. I WELCOME THIS, AND I BELIEVE THAT OUR COOPERATION IN THE NON-PROLIFERATION FIELD WILL BE OF GREAT SIGNIFICANCE BOTH GLOBALLY AND IN EAST ASIA.

STILL FACING JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES IS AN EXTREMELY SERIOUS ISSUE: THE DIRECTOR OF OUR DOMESTIC NUCLEAR ENERGY POLICIES. IF WE DECIDE TO USE SENSITIVE NUCLEAR MATERIALS, PARTICULARLY PLUTONIUM, FOR COMMERCIAL PURPOSES, THEN I FEAR THAT OTHER COUNTRIES WILL FOLLOW SUIT. THE RESULTING DAMAGE TO OUR NON-PROLIFERATION EFFORTS COULD BE GREAT, EVEN IRREPARABLE.

LAST JULY SEVERAL OF MY SENATE COLLEAGUES AND I OPPOSED THE OPERATION OF AN AMERICAN REPROCESSING PLANT IN BARNWELL, SOUTH CAROLINA, TO PRODUCE PLUTONIUM. THE ADMINISTRATION HAS DECIDED TO EXCLUDE PRODUCING PLUTONIUM AT BARNWELL, USING IT INSTEAD TO DEVELOP MORE PROLIFERATION-PROOF TECHNOLOGIES. PLUTONIUM IS NOT ONLY HIGHLY EXPLOSIVE BUT IS ALSO ONE OF THE MOST TOXIC MATERIALS KNOWN TO MAN. I AM PERSUADED THAT THERE IS AMPLE URANIUM FOR EXISTING AND PROJECTED NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS INTO THE NEXT CENTURY. WE SHOULD MAKE CONCERTED EFFORTS TO IDENTIFY AND EXPLOIT URANIUM RESOURCES AROUND THE
WORLD. WE ALWAYS HAVE THE POSSIBILITY OF PRODUCING THE PLUTONIUM AT A LATER TIME--IF IT IS SAFE TO DO SO AND IF URANIUM BECOMES UNECONOMIC AS A FUEL.

MOST IMPORTANTLY, MY COLLEAGUES AND I FEEL THAT COMMERCIAL PRODUCTION OF PLUTONIUM WOULD BE AN EXTREMELY BAD EXAMPLE TO SET. TAIWAN AND SOUTH KOREA HAVE DECIDED NOT TO PRODUCE OR USE PLUTONIUM. THEY DESERVE CREDIT FOR AGREEING NOT TO DO SO.

WE ARE HOPEFUL THAT OTHER COUNTRIES WILL ABSTAIN FROM DEVELOPING A PLUTONIUM ECONOMY AS WELL, AS LONG AS WE LACK ADEQUATE PROTECTION AGAINST DIVERSION OR WITHDRAWAL FROM SAFEGUARDS. FOR THEM TO ACQUIRE PLUTONIUM OR THE CAPABILITY TO PRODUCE IT IS FOR THEM TO BE ONE CRITICAL STEP CLOSER TO A NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY.

NONE OF THIS IS TO DENY THE POSSIBILITY OF USING PLUTONIUM IN NUCLEAR BREEDER REACTORS IF AND WHEN WE DO DEVELOP ADEQUATE PROTECTION. DURING THE CURRENT FISCAL YEAR, THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION IS SPENDING UP TO $483 MILLION ON BREEDER RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, WITH SPECIAL ATTENTION TO NEW SAFEGUARDS APPROACHES. I SUPPORT THIS EXPENDITURE AS MUCH AS I DO THE DECISIONS BY PRESIDENTS FORD AND CARTER TO DEFER THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF REPROCESSING AND PLUTONIUM USE IN THE UNITED STATES.

OF COURSE THE TOKAI REPROCESSING FACILITY PRESENTS A SIMILAR PROBLEM FOR JAPAN AS WELL AS FOR MY COUNTRY. TOKAI WOULD PRODUCE PLUTONIUM FROM URANIUM SUPPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES. I WELCOME THE INTERIM AGREEMENT WE BOTH REACHED LAST SEPTEMBER ON TOKAI, WHICH PROTECTED JAPAN'S LONG TERM NUCLEAR ENERGY PROGRAMS AT THE SAME TIME AS IT RECOGNIZED THE "SERIOUS PROLIFERATION DANGER" OF PLUTONIUM AND THE NEED TO AVOID ITS PREMATURE COMMERCIALIZATION.

THIS AGREEMENT NOW MAKES IT POSSIBLE FOR US TO INVESTIGATE OBJECTIVELY, OVER THE NEXT TWO YEARS, THE CRUCIAL ISSUES OF URANIUM AVAILABILITY AND THE CONTROL OF THE NEXT GENERATION OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY. WE MUST USE THIS TIME WISELY, TO DEVELOP NEW APPROACHES.
TO NUCLEAR ENERGY WHILE REDUCING THE NUCLEAR HAZARDS WHICH HAVE DOGGED US FOR THE PAST THREE DECADES.

MANY OF THE SOLUTIONS CAN AND SHOULD BE DEVELOPED IN THE CONTEXT OF THE INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE EVALUATION, WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF BOTH NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS AND NUCLEAR CONSUMERS. I STRONGLY BELIEVE THAT THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN SHOULD TAKE THE LEAD IN ACHIEVING THESE SOLUTIONS AND IN PREVENTING THE SUPPLIER/CONSUMER DIVISIONS WHICH HAVE BEDEVILLED INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC, INCLUDING ENERGY, NEGOTIATIONS IN OTHER AREAS. THE KEY FACTORS WILL BE THE EXAMPLE WE OURSELVES SET AND OUR READINESS TO ADOPT A NON-DISCRIMINATORY APPROACH TO THE PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY. IN SHORT, IF WE COMMERCIALIZE PLUTONIUM, IT WOULD BE HYPOCRITICAL TO ASK OTHERS NOT TO.

Perhaps the most promising solutions will be in the fields of nuclear fuel supply and nuclear waste management. If these are addressed successfully, pressures for reprocessing and plutonium use can be sharply reduced.

I see great merit in proposals for an international nuclear fuel bank. Such a bank would enable the international community to "pool" uranium fuel,
ASSURING AMPLE, RELIABLE AND ECONOMIC SUPPLY IN RETURN FOR EFFECTIVE SAFEGUARDS AND CONTROLS. I PROPOSE THAT OUR TWO COUNTRIES CONSIDER TOGETHER ESTABLISHMENT OF LONG-TERM FUEL RESERVES, POSSIBLY THROUGH JOINT INVESTMENT IN URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITIES WHICH WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO SUCH RESERVES. THE OBJECTIVE WOULD BE TO ASSURE AN ATTRACTIVE AND STABLE INTERNATIONAL MARKET FOR NUCLEAR FUELS, BASED ON EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS AND CONTROLS.

I ALSO BELIEVE IT IS CRUCIAL TO DEVELOP SAFE AND AMPLE INTERNATIONAL FACILITIES FOR STORING SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL, WHICH CAN BE RETRIEVED IF AND WHEN PLUTONIUM CAN BE SAFELY PRODUCED AND USED. NOT ONLY COULD SUCH FACILITIES ELIMINATE THE FREQUENT ARGUMENT THAT INADEQUATE STORAGE CAPACITY FORCES REPROCESSING, EVEN IF THE RESULTING PLUTONIUM IS RECOGNIZED TO BE UNSAFE, THEY WOULD ALSO PROVE TO BE LESS COSTLY AND DANGEROUS UNDER EXISTING CONDITIONS. I PROPOSE THAT THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN ESTABLISH A SPENT FUEL STORAGE CENTER, POSSIBLY ON TERRITORY OWNED BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT IN THE PACIFIC. THIS CENTER WOULD REDUCE PRESSURES ON JAPANESE STORAGE FACILITIES AND WOULD BE OPEN ALSO TO OTHER NUCLEAR CONSUMERS ON THE SAME NON-PROLIFERATION TERMS AS THE URANIUM FUEL RESERVES.

I SEE GREAT HOPE FOR BOLD, IMAGINATIVE, INTENSIVE COOPERATION BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES—COOPERATION WHICH WILL MEET OUR ENERGY NEEDS WHILE REDUCING THE DANGERS OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION. THIS COOPERATION WOULD BEFIT THE INCREASINGLY CLOSE AND VARIED RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OUR DEMOCRATIC, INDUSTRIALIZED SOCIETIES. IT WOULD TAKE PLACE IN THE MULTILATERAL SUPPLIER-CONSUMER CONTEXT OF THE INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE EVALUATION. THIS COOPERATION WOULD ACCORD WITH THE PROFOUND NON-NUCLEAR TRADITION OF JAPAN, WITH JAPAN’S LEADING ROLE IN THE FIELD OF NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT.

WE ARE NOW AT A CRUCIAL STAGE, ALMOST AS CRUCIAL AS THE COLD DAWN OF THE NUCLEAR ERA. WE HAVE LEARNED HOW TO CONTROL—EFFECTIVELY AND SAFELY—THE FIRST GENERATION OF NUCLEAR REACTORS AND NUCLEAR FUEL. DESPITE SOME FOLLIES IN THE ATOMS FOR PEACE PERIOD, WE SUCCESSFULLY ESTABLISHED AN UNPRECEDENTED INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM INTEGRALLY TIED TO THE
IAEA AND EVENTUALLY THE NON-PROLIFERAATION TREATY,
INTERNATIONAL CONSENSUS ON NON-PROLIFERATION MUST
BE REINFORCED BY ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR TESTS,
REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS AND A GENERAL
DEVALUATION OF THE ROLE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN WORLD
POLITICS.

WE ARE NOW CONFRONTED WITH THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR
TECHNOLOGY TO OTHER, LESS STABLE REGIONS OF THE WORLD.
NUCLEAR CONTROLS MUST BECOME EVEN MORE EFFECTIVE, AND
MUST REMAIN AS NON-DISCRIMINATORY AS POSSIBLE IN THE
PEACEFUL NUCLEAR FIELD.

WE ARE CONFRONTED AS WELL WITH INCREASED PRESSURES
TO MOVE TO A SECOND, SELF-SUSTAINING GENERATION OF
NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY IN WHICH THE CENTERPIECE IS THE
BREEDER REACTOR. WE MUST NOT ENTER IT PREMATURELY.
WE MUST RECOGNIZE OUR OBLIGATION TO PROTECT OUR
SOCIETIES AT LEAST AS WELL FROM THE DANGERSS OF THIS
SECOND GENERATION AS FROM THE FIRST. AT THE SAME TIME,
WE CAN AND SHOULD INCREASE OUR ENERGY SECURITY THROUGH
ASSURED SUPPLY OF NON-SENSITIVE NUCLEAR REACTORS AND
FUEL UNDER EFFECTIVE SAFEGUARDS, AND THROUGH ACTIVE
BREEDER RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT.

AT THE CONCLUSION OF "BLACK RAIN," SHIGEMATSU
PROPHESIED THAT "IF A RAINBOW APPEARS OVER THOSE
HILLS NOW, A MIRACLE WILL HAPPEN. LET A RAINBOW
APPEAR--NOT A WHITE ONE, BUT ONE OF MANY HUES--
AND YASUKO WILL BE CURED." HE KNEW THE MIRACLE
WOULD NEVER COME TRUE, BUT HE KEPT HIS EYES ON THE
NEARBY HILLS.

LET US KEEP OUR EYES ON THE NEARBY HILLS AND
WORK INCREASINGLY TOWARD RIDDING HIS EACH OF THE
SCOURGE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THAT MIRACLE MAY NEVER
HAPPEN. BUT WE WILL HAVE JUSTIFIED ALL THE PAIN-
STAKING EFFORT IF WE MAKE OUR LIVES--AND THOSE OF
GENERATIONS TO COME--EVEN SLIGHTLY MORE SECURE.

END REVISED TEXT.
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Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014