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INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY
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E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PARM

SUBJ: DEPUTY MINISTER SEMENOV'S STATEMENT OF OCTOBER 4, 1974
(SALT TWO-455)

THE FOLLOWING IS STATEMENT DELIVERED BY DEPUTY
MINISTER SEMENOV AT THE SALT TWO MEETING OF OCTOBER 4,
1974.

QUOTE

SEMEMOV STATEMENT, OCTOBER 4, 1974

MR. AMBASSADOR,

YOUR STATEMENT WILL BE STUDIED WITH DUE ATTENTION AND
WE HOPE TO EXPRESS OUT CONSIDERATIONS ON THE CORRESPONDING
QUESTIONS LATER.

IN OUR STATEMENT TODAY WE INTEND TO TAKE UP SOME OF
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THE ASPECTS SINCE WE HAVE HAD THEM IN OUR FIELD OF VISION
EVEN BEFORE THIS.


WHEN ONE SIDE MOVES UP ITS OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR SYSTEMS TOWARD THE ORDER OF THE OTHER SIDE BY ESTABLISHING BASES ON THE TERRITORIES OF THIRD COUNTRIES, THIS EXPANDS THE ASSORTMENT OF THAT SIDE’S WEAPONS WHICH ARE CAPABLE OF EXECUTING STRATEGIC MISSIONS. THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS OF ONE SIDE, WHICH ARE CAPABLE OF REACHING TARGETS ON THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER SIDE, CONSTITUTE, REGARDLESS OF THEIR LOCATION, A COMPONENT OF THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARSENAL OF THE SIDE POSSESSING SUCH WEAPONS. FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE SECURITY OF A STATE, IT MAKES NO SUBSTANTIVE DIFFERENCE WHICH NUCLEAR SYSTEMS CAN STRIKE TARGETS ON ITS TERRITORY. WE KNOW OF COMPUTATION PUBLISHED IN THE U.S. PRESS, WHICH SHOW THAT A CONSIDERABLE PORTION OF THE POPULATION AND ECONOMIC POTENTIAL OF THE USSR IS LOCATED WITHIN RANGE OF U.S. FORWARD-BASED NUCLEAR SYSTEMS. MOREOVER, THE FORWARD-BASED NUCLEAR SYSTEMS LOCATED ON THE TERRITORY OF THIRD COUNTRIES, IN SOME RESPECTS MAY BE SUPERIOR TO OTHER TYPES OF STRATEGIC ARMAMENTS, FOR EXAMPLE, IN TERMS OF DELIVERY TIME OF WEAPONS TO TARGET. ALL THIS MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN OUR DISCUSSIONS AND IN THE COURSE OF REACHING AGREEMENT.

HISTORICALLY, MILITARY BASES ON THE TERRITORY OF THIRD COUNTRIES APPEARED DURING THE PERIOD OF THE LAST WAR, AND NUCLEAR SYSTEMS ON BASES OF THE U.S. – DURING THE PERIOD OF THE “COLD WAR”. THAT PERIOD, HOWEVER, IS BEHIND US. IT IS OBVIOUS THAT THERE ARE NO REASONABLE GROUNDS FOR RETAINING FORWARD-BASED NUCLEAR SYSTEMS AND CORRESPONDING BASES ON THE TERRITORY OF THIRD COUNTRIES IN THE FUTURE AS WELL. FOR MANY REASONS THEIR EXISTENCE IN THIRD COUNTRIES NOT ONLY DOES NOT REDUCE, BUT ON THE CONTRARY INCREASES THE THREAT OF OUTBREAK OF NUCLEAR WAR AND HAS A NEGATIVE IMPACT ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY.
IN ESSENCE, THE EXISTENCE OF U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS
BASES ON THE TERRITORY OF THIRD COUNTRIES EXPAND THE NUMBER
OF "EXPLOSIVE AREAS" AND INCREASES THE RISK OF RAPID EXCAVA-
TION OF CONFLICTS WHICH MIGHT ARISE IN THESE AREAS. ALL
THIS OBJECTIVELY CREATES THE DANGER THAT THE USSR AND
THE U.S. MAY FIND THEMSELVES DRAWN INTO A NUCLEAR WAR. EVEN
AGAINST THEIR WILL.

NEITHER CAN IT BE DISREGARDED THAT THE DEPLOYMENT OF
U.S. OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON THE TERRITORY OF THIRD
COUNTRIES CANNOT BE NEGATIVELY AFFECT THE RELIABILITY
OF MEASURES TO PREVENT ACCIDENTAL OR UNAUTHORIZED USE OF
THESE WEAPONS. NOR CAN ONE, IN DEPLOYING NUCLEAR WEAPONS
ON FOREIGN TERRITORIES, FAIL TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE RISK
OF PROVOCATIVE ACTS, WHETHER ON THE PART OF THOSE WHO
MIGHT WANT TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THIS TO CAUSE A NUCLEAR
CONFLICT, OR ON THE PART OF SOME SORT OR CRIMINAL GROUP.
IT MIGHT BE SAID THAT THIS IS MUCH TO UNLIKELY A HYPO-
THESIS. BUT, REFLECTING ON WHAT COULD BE THE CONSEQUENCES
OF SUCH HYPOTHETICAL SITUATIONS, IT IS ALSO NOT DIFFICULT
TO IMAGINE THE EXTENT OF THE DANGERS THEY INVOLVE, WHICH
SHOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BE AVOIDED.

AS YOU KNOW, SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS HAVE TAKEN A
FUNDAMENTAL POSITIVE TURN OVER THE PAST TWO YEARS. THIS
HAS A PROFOUND EFFECT ON THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE OVERALL
INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE. OBJECTIVE PREREQUISITES EXIST FOR
THE FURTHER CONSTRUCTIVE DEVELOPMENT OF RELATIONS BETWEEN
THE USSR AND THE U.S. IN THE COMING YEARS, TO THE BENEFIT
OF OUR PEOPLES AND IN THE INTEREST OF STRENGTHENING
UNIVERSAL PEACE AND SECURITY.

OF COURSE, THIS PROCESS Requires FURTHER ACTIVE
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The new agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive
arms for the period until 1985 is called upon to play
an important role in the further improvement of soviet-
american relations. and this, among other problems, also
involves resolving the question of liquidating the bases,
located on the territory of foreign states, for nuclear
weapons capable of reaching targets on the territory of
the other side. we are convinced that this would be a
very big step along the road toward further easing inter-
national tension, eliminating the risk of outbreak of
nuclear war and strengthening universal peace.

The soviet side believes it advisable to resolve in
PRINCIPLE THE QUESTION OF LIQUIDATING BASES, LOCATED ON FOREIGN TERRITORIES, FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABLE OF REACHING THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER SIDE.

THE SOVIET SIDE IS PREPARED TO CONSIDER VARIANTS FOR ACCOMPLISHING, ALL AT ONCE OR IN STAGES, THE WITHDRAWAL OF FORWARD-BASED SYSTEMS AS STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR SYSTEMS, AND LIQUIDATION OF THE CORRESPONDING BASES ON THE TERRITORY OF THIRD COUNTRIES, AND WILL TAKE THIS INTO ACCOUNT IN WORKING OUT A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT.

THE SOVIET SIDE SUGGESTS, FIRST OF ALL, HALTING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW NUCLEAR WEAPONS BASES IN THIRD COUNTRIES, WITHIN RANGE OF THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER SIDE, AND NOT ESTABLISHING SUCH BASES IN THE FUTURE.

IN THE COURSE OF OUT NEGOTIATIONS, AT THIS PHASE IN GENEVA, AS WELL, NO WEIGHTY ARGUMENTS HAVE BEEN PRESENTED AGAINST CONSIDERING AND RESOLVING THE QUESTION OF WITHDRAWING FORWARD-BASED SYSTEMS AND LIQUIDATING NUCLEAR WEAPONS BASES ON FOREIGN TERRITORIES. THE TASK PLACED BEFORE US OF SEEKING WAYS TOWARD A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS FOR THE PERIOD UNTIL 1985, OFFERS NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR CONSIDERING VARIANTS FOR ACCOMPLISHING THE WITHDRAWAL OF FORWARD-BASED SYSTEMS ALL AT ONCE OR IN STAGES. WE WOULD STUDY WITH SECRET

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DUE ATTENTION THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE U.S. DELEGATION ON THIS QUESTION.

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A substantial factor influencing the strategic situation is the existence of forward submarine bases of one of the sides on the territory of third states. These bases created unilateral advantages for the point of view of supporting the operational activity of ballistic missile submarines, increasing their operational reliability, reducing deployment time and extending on-station time. This, in practice, is equivalent to increasing the number of operationally ready SLBM launchers of one side.

As has already been emphasized, aircraft carriers, in essence, are mobile airfields for nuclear delivery can be moved up toward the frontiers of the other side, thus leading to an increase in the number of nuclear weapons ready for use against targets on the territory of the other side.

These factors cannot remain outside out field of vision while working out an agreement for the period until 1985.

The USSR delegation has instructions to reaffirm the position of the Soviet Union concerning withdrawal of ballistic missile submarines and attack carriers beyond agreed limits, and with liquidation of the corresponding bases on the territory of third countries, would be of great importance in terms of working out mutually acceptable limitations on strategic offensive arms, as well as from the point of view of reducing the risk of nuclear war and increasing mutual trust between the sides. This measure could be an important step in accomplishing the task before us and would not require any changes in the force structure of each side.

Mr. Ambassador,
FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF EMBODYING IN THE NEW AGREEMENT THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY AND INADMISSIBILITY OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE, SOLVING THE PROBLEM OF LIMITING STRATEGIC BOMBERS IS OF GREAT IMPORTANCE. WORKING OUT MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE LIMITATIONS ON THIS IMPORTANT TYPE OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO STRENGTHENING THE SECURITY OF THE SIDES AND WOULD BE A MAJOR STEP IN LIMITING AND HALTING THE COMPETITION IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

AS FAR AS CAN BE JUDGED FROM THE STATEMENTS OF THE U.S. DELEGATION, IN PARTICULAR AT THE OCTOBER 1 MEETING, THE U.S. SIDE ALSO BELIEVES IT NECESSARY TO FIND MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS FOR THIS QUESTION.

THE NEW AGREEMENT ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS FOR THE PERIOD UNTIL 1985, MUST, WITH RESPECT TO STRATEGIC BOMBERS, PROVIDE FOR QUANTITATIVE LIMITATIONS BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY AND INADMISSIBILITY OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE. SUCH LIMITATIONS MUST EFFECTIVELY CONTRIBUTE TO ACCOMPLISHING THE TASKS SPECIFIED IN THE UNDERSTANDING OF JULY 3, 1974.

IN CONSIDERING THIS QUESTION IT IS NECESSARY TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT NUCLEAR DELIVERY AIRCRAFT ABOARD CARRIERS. THE CAPABILITIES OF AIRCRAFT CARRIERS TO MANEUVER AND THEIR SECRET

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PRACTICALLY UNLIMITED SAILING RANGE GIVE THE DELIVERY AIRCRAFT ABOARD THE CHARACTERISTIC OF STRATEGIC BOMBERS. THUS DELIVERY AIRCRAFT ABOARD CARRIERS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED A PART OF STRATEGIC AVIATION.

IN CONSIDERING LIMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC BOMBERS IT IS NECESSARY TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT NOT ONLY THE BOMBERS THEMSELVES, BUT ALSO THE EWAPONS THEY CAN CARRY. SUCH AN APPROACH WOULD PERMIT A MORE COMPLETE AND COMPREHENSIVE CONSIDERATION OF THE QUESTION OF ESTABLISHING ADEQUATE LIMITATIONS ON THIS TYPE OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

CONSIDERATION OF THE QUESTION OF LIMITING STRATEGIC BOMBERS ONLY, WITHOUT REGARD FOR THE WEAPONS THEY CAN CARRY WOULD NOT MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO TAKE FULLY INTO ACCOUNT THE INFLUENCE OF THIS TYPE OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPON ON THE STRATEGIC SITUATION. AND WORKING OUT MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE LIMITATIONS IN THIS REGARD WOULD BE MADE MORE DIFFICULT. MOREOVER, IT IS PRECISELY THE ARMAMENTS OF STRATEGIC BOMBERS THAT HARBORS POTENTIAL POSSIBILITY FOR THE APPEARANCE OF NEW CHANNELS FOR THE RACE IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.
IN WORKING OUT THE NEW AGREEMENT FOR THE PERIOD UNTIL 1985, IT WOULD ALSO BE ADVISABLE TO CONSIDER THE QUESTION OF RESTRAINT BY BOTH SIDES WITH REGARD TO THE DEVELOPMENT FOR NEW TYPES OF STRATEGIC BOMBERS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW ARMAMENTS OF THIS TYPE OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPON.

In this connection, the USSR delegation has instructions to propose that the new agreement provide for an undertaking not to develop, test or deploy long range air-to-surface missiles. This means, specifically, that strategic bombers would not be equipped with such missiles. I would like to clarify that long range air-to-surface missiles are missiles with a range of in excess of 600 kilometers.

Implementation of these proposals would be an important contribution to solving the problem of limiting strategic offensive arms and working out the provisions of the new agreement.

In its statement of October 1, 1974, the U.S. delegation advanced the concept of constraining the "potential of the system of strategic central systems" by limiting their "throw-weight."

The USSR delegation has already expressed the point of view of the Soviet side that division of strategic offensive arms into "central" and "non-central" systems is unfounded. In working out the new agreement limitations must be considered on all types of strategic offensive arms capable of striking targets on the territory of the other side. Only such an approach is in accord with the principle of equal security and inadmissibility of unilateral advantage, which is agreed between the sides.

The concept of limiting the "throw-weight" of one of several separately selected types of strategic offensive arms taken into account neither the different paths of technological development that have come about historically, nor the objective picture in this field in all of its fullness. This concept gives a one-sided impression of the way things really are, and can lead us astray from the search for ways to embody in the new agreement the principle of equal security and inadmissibility of unilateral advantage.

In considering these questions one must not forget about such systems as, for example, forward-based nuclear systems and nuclear delivery aircraft aboard carriers.
WHICH HAVE CONSIDERABLE “THROW-WEIGHT” POTENTIAL. THUS, EVEN IF “THROWWEIGHT” WERE TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT, IT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR THE WHOLE TOTALITY OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, INCLUDING FORWARD-BASED NUCLEAR SYSTEMS AND NUCLEAR DELIVERY AIRCRAFT ABOARD CARRIERS. IN THIS CONNECTION, THE “THROW-WEIGHT” OF AIRCRAFT WOULD BE THEIR MAXIMUM BOMB LOAD.

ONLY WITH SUCH A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH WOULD IT BE POSSIBLE TO AVOID VIOLATING THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY AND INADMISSIBILITY OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE IN WORKING OUT THE NEW AGREEMENT ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

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UNQUOTE
JOHNSON